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This paper explores heterogeneous exits—bankruptcy, voluntary liq-
uidation, and merger—by focusing on new ﬁrms. Using a sample of
approximately 16,000 ﬁrms founded in Japan during 1997–2004, we ex-
amine the determinants of new-ﬁrm exit according to forms of exit. Re-
garding industry-speciﬁc characteristics, our ﬁndings indicate that new
ﬁrms in capital-intensive and R&D-intensive industries are less likely to
go bankrupt. In industries characterized by large amounts of capital and
low price–cost margins, new ﬁrms are more likely to exit through vol-
untary liquidation and merger. Region-speciﬁc characteristics, such as
regional agglomeration and unemployment rate, have signiﬁcant eﬀects
on the hazards of exit, and their eﬀects vary across diﬀerent forms of exit.
Moreover, we provide evidence that ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics, such as
the number of employees, and entrepreneur-speciﬁc characteristics, such
as educational background and age, play signiﬁcantly diﬀerent roles in
determining each form of exit.
Keywords: New ﬁrm; exit; bankruptcy; voluntary liquidation; merger; competing
risks proportional hazards model.
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Many new ﬁrms exit the market after starting their businesses. Some ﬁrms are
forced to go bankrupt because of business failure, and other ﬁrms disappear because
of merger, which might be regarded as the result of success. In addition, it has
been observed that entrepreneurs sometimes voluntarily dissolve their businesses.
Although new ﬁrms exit the market in such diﬀerent ways, all forms of exit are
regarded as homogeneous in the existing literature. However, it is possible that the
eﬀects of factors aﬀecting each form of exit oﬀset between forms of exit; therefore,
ignoring heterogeneity between forms of exit would yield incorrect interpretations.
To provide a better understanding of industry dynamics, we explore heterogeneous
exits—bankruptcy, voluntary liquidation, and merger—by focusing on new ﬁrms. In
particular, we examine empirically how factors aﬀecting new-ﬁrm exit vary across
the forms of exit.
It is well recognized that new small-sized ﬁrms play a key role in innovation
(e.g., Acs and Audretsch, 1990). New entrants not only promote innovation, but
also create opportunities for employment. In addition, they are expected to intensify
vigorous competition in industries, which can stimulate economic growth. In this
respect, promoting new entry is fairly important from the perspective of economic
policy. On the other hand, it is well known that new ﬁrms tend to face diﬃculties
because of fewer resources and inexperience. In fact, some new ﬁrms are likely to
exit the market within a few years. Other things being equal, new ﬁrms are more
likely to exit from competitive industries than from uncompetitive industries. More
precisely, bankruptcy resulting from failure tends to occur in competitive industries,
although it is inconclusive that other forms of exit, which do not necessarily indicate
failure, tend to occur in such industries. To understand the survival and exit of new
ﬁrms more accurately, we provide new evidence on how the determinants of new-ﬁrm
exit vary according to forms of exit.
2In this study, we examine empirically the eﬀects of industry-, region-, ﬁrm- and
entrepreneur-speciﬁc characteristics on new-ﬁrm exit according to forms of exit, us-
ing a sample of ﬁrms founded in Japan during 1997–2004. Then, we provide evidence
that these eﬀects vary signiﬁcantly between forms of exit, by estimating a compet-
ing risks proportional hazards model. It is expected that this paper contributes to
the development of research on industry dynamics and provides important ideas for
policy makers.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe
the background and related literature of this paper. Section 3 explains the data
and method employed in the analysis. Our model of the determinants of exit is
discussed in Section 4. The empirical results are presented in Section 5. The ﬁnal
section includes some concluding remarks.
2. Background and related literature
In the ﬁeld of industrial organization, scholars have realized that entry and exit
play an essential role in industry dynamics. Entry and exit, which are often re-
garded as ‘turbulence’ in the market, are vital to maintaining vigorous competition
in industries. In fact, a large number of empirical studies have provided insights
into the determinants of entry and exit; for example, Dunne et al. (1988) showed
the patterns of entry and exit over time in US manufacturing industries.1 Among
new ﬁrms, some ﬁrms survive and grow in the market through the learning process.
Because new ﬁrms are expected to contribute to the development of industries, it
is beneﬁcial to promote the creation of new ﬁrms with growth potential. On the
other hand, some ﬁrms are forced to exit under competitive pressure. Entry and exit
play a key role in maintaining the natural selection mechanism through competition,
1For a survey of evidence on entry and exit, see, for example, Siegfried and Evans (1994), Carree
(2006), and Santarelli and Vivarelli (2007). For more discussions on entry and exit, see also Geroski
(1995) and Caves (1998).
3which is required to achieve economic eﬃciency in industries.
Much attention has been paid to the post-entry performance of new ﬁrms as
a way to assess the competitive process in markets. The survival and exit of new
ﬁrms have been addressed in a rich stream of literature. To date, a large number
of empirical studies have examined the survival and exit of ﬁrms during the start-
up period. Audretsch (1991), for example, estimated the determinants of 10-year
survival rates for new establishments, using a logit model. Wagner (1994) also
examined the survival of new ﬁrms and the duration of survival in years, using
a probit model and a tobit model, respectively. Audretsch and Mahmood (1991,
1995) applied a proportional hazards model proposed by Cox (1972) (PH model,
henceforth) to analyze the survival and exit of new establishments and ﬁrms. The
PH model has several advantages over binary choice models such as the logit and
probit models, because the PH model takes into account the duration of ﬁrm survival
and censoring of observations. Given that post-entry performance depends on ﬁrms’
life cycles, the PH model based on ﬁrms’ age is more suitable. By using the PH
model, we can utilize not only information on whether the ﬁrm exits but also the
time at which the ﬁrm exits. Mata and Portugal (1994) and Mata et al. (1995) used
the PH model to estimate the determinants of survival of new ﬁrms and plants in
Portugal. Honjo (2000a) also investigated the determinants of business failure of
new ﬁrms in Japan, excluding other forms of exit.2
Although it is worthwhile to understand what factors have more inﬂuence on
the survival and exit of new ﬁrms, the previous studies tend to treat all forms of
exit as homogeneous. As Parker (2009) pointed out, entrepreneurs close businesses
for a variety of reasons, and there are economic diﬀerences between forms of exit.
Ignoring heterogeneity between the forms of exit may yield incorrect interpretations
of the factors leading to the survival and exit of ﬁrms. Nevertheless, research that
2For Japan, Doi (1999) examined the determinants of ﬁrm exit at the industry level. Harada
(2007) also examined the determinants of small-ﬁrm exit in Japan, by distinguishing between
economic-forced exit and non-economic-forced exit.
4focuses on diﬀerent forms of exit for new ﬁrms has been quite scarce until now, partly
because of data unavailability. We therefore estimate the determinants of new-ﬁrm
exit by distinguishing bankruptcy, regarded as unsuccessful exit, from other forms
of exit, including merger. In this respect, we provide new evidence on how factors
aﬀecting new-ﬁrm exit vary across the forms of exit. By taking into account the
diﬀerent forms of exit, our analysis helps us better understand factors promoting
industrial dynamics.
To date, much literature have highlighted ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics as factors
aﬀecting post-entry performance.3 Some studies have examined whether ﬁrm size
and age aﬀect post-entry performance (e.g., Evans, 1987). While ﬁrm-speciﬁc char-
acteristics do have an impact on survival and exit, it can be useful to investigate
how the survival and exit of new ﬁrms depend on industry-speciﬁc characteristics, in
order to understand factors promoting market competition from the perspective of
economic policy. Given that economic eﬃciency and allocation are achieved in the
competitive process, it is hoped that entry and exit occur smoothly. However, when
an entrepreneur intends to enter or exit a market, this behavior may be inﬂuenced
by barriers to entry and exit, associated with industry-speciﬁc characteristics. To
shed light on the competitive process, we assess whether and how the probability of
exit of new ﬁrms diﬀers across industries. In addition to industry-speciﬁc character-
istics, some recent studies have found that regional factors, such as agglomeration,
matter in the post-entry performance of new ﬁrms (e.g., Fritsch et al., 2006; Falck,
2007). Compared with established ﬁrms, new ﬁrms are more vulnerable to environ-
mental factors, including industry- and regional-speciﬁc characteristics. Exploring
3With respect to the determinants of exit, some studies have highlighted the eﬀects of ﬁnancial
conditions on the survival and exit of ﬁrms (e.g., Evans and Jovanovic, 1989). Even if a new ﬁrm has
growth potential, the ﬁrm cannot necessarily secure suﬃcient funds from external capital markets
because of a lack of business history. This is because, as Berger and Udell (1998) argued, new ﬁrms
are arguably the most informationally opaque, and adverse selection and moral hazard problems due
to information asymmetries hinder external ﬁnancing of the ﬁrms’ activities. Although the eﬀects
of ﬁnancial conditions may provide interesting insights into ﬁnancial strategies, this paper does not
examine the eﬀects of ﬁnancial conditions mainly because we did not obtain ﬁnancial statements.
5how these environments shape each form of exit of new ﬁrms will provide us with
insights into industry dynamics.
Furthermore, the role of entrepreneurs’ human capital in new ﬁrms has been
emphasized in the literature.4 It has often been argued that entrepreneurs’ human
capital is a valuable resource for new ﬁrms, and plays a critical role in ﬁrms’ perfor-
mance, mainly because new ﬁrms tend to have fewer resources and lack experience
(e.g., Colombo and Grilli, 2005). In practice, a number of studies have provided
evidence that entrepreneurs’ human capital signiﬁcantly aﬀects the post-entry per-
formance of new ﬁrms. Presumably, entrepreneurs’ human capital relates to ﬁrms’
resources and decisions—especially during the start-up period. Until now, how-
ever, there has been quite limited evidence on how entrepreneurial factors aﬀecting
new-ﬁrm exit vary according to forms of exit. Using data on entrepreneur-speciﬁc
characteristics, we thus estimate the determinants of exit, according to the forms of
exit.
As mentioned above, there are diﬀerent forms of exit, and the determinants of
new-ﬁrm exit are considered to vary according to forms of exit. In practice, several
studies, although not focusing on new ﬁrms, have addressed the diﬀerent forms of
exit. Schary (1991) highlighted three forms of exit, merger, voluntary liquidation,
and bankruptcy, using data on 61 ﬁrms in the cotton textile industry of New Eng-
land. Harhoﬀ et al. (1998) distinguished between two forms of exit, bankruptcy and
voluntary liquidation, and estimated the determinants of exits, using a sample of
ﬁrms in West Germany. These studies emphasized that ﬁrms exit the market in
several ways and that each form of exit is likely to be caused by diﬀerent factors.
Harhoﬀ et al. (1998), for example, found that the owner’s age aﬀects the probability
4Several studies have examined entrepreneurial exit from self-employment; these studies es-
timated the determinants of entrepreneurs’ self-employment duration by distinguishing between
failure and a transition to alternative employment (e.g., Taylor, 1999; Cueto and Mato, 2006). In
fact, as mentioned above, entrepreneurs close their businesses for a variety of reasons, and some
voluntarily dissolve their businesses. As Parker (2009) pointed out, entrepreneurs may plan to exit
within a predetermined time to harvest their investment.
6of voluntary liquidation, but it does not aﬀect that of bankruptcy. However, their
ﬁndings tend to be limited to relatively large established ﬁrms, rather than small-
sized new ﬁrms. As Evans (1987) indicated, the survival and exit of ﬁrms depends
heavily on ﬁrms’ age, and the performance of ﬁrms with a long history diﬀers con-
siderably from that of new ﬁrms. Therefore, research that focuses only on new ﬁrms
is required to clarify the diﬀerences of determinants between the forms of exit.
Esteve-P´ erez et al. (2009) estimated the determinants of diﬀerent forms of exit,
liquidation and acquisition. They examined the duration of ﬁrms, regardless of
when these ﬁrms entered the market, using a competing risks proportional hazards
model (henceforth, CPH model), which is explained below.5 As repeatedly argued,
entrepreneurs close businesses for a variety of reasons, and there are economic diﬀer-
ences between the forms of exit. To better understand the post-entry performance
of new ﬁrms from the perspective of industry dynamics, it is necessary to take into
account the diﬀerent forms of exit. Following Esteve-P´ erez et al., we apply the CPH
model to the post-entry performance of new ﬁrms, since the duration of survival
is censored. Using a comprehensive data set of new ﬁrms in Japan, we examine
the eﬀects of industry-, region-, ﬁrm-, and entrepreneur-speciﬁc characteristics on
new-ﬁrm exit. By doing so, we provide new evidence on how the determinants of
new-ﬁrm exit vary according to forms of exit.
5We point out that these studies have faced a left-truncation problem in their samples. Even
though Esteve-P´ erez et al. estimated the duration of ﬁrms using the CPH model, a left-truncation
problem arises because their sample includes ﬁrms for which life duration cannot be traced in the
observation period. To avoid the left-truncation problem, the sample should be restricted to ﬁrms
that can be observed from their starting point. In addition, previous studies taking into account
the forms of exit have not distinguished between the three forms of exit—bankruptcy, voluntary
liquidation, and merger.
73. Data and method
3.1. Data sources
The data set employed in this paper comes from the TSR Data Bank compiled by
Tokyo Shoko Research (TSR), which is one of the major credit investigation com-
panies in Japan. As a public data source, for example, the Establishment and En-
terprise Census reports the numbers of entrants and exits, based on establishments,
in each industry or region. However, it is quite diﬃcult to obtain individual data
from public data sources, and, in general, we cannot identify which establishment
(or ﬁrm) is active or extinct using these sources. In addition, when these sources
are used, there is the possibility that the relocation of an establishment to another
region is regarded as an exit even though the establishment remains in the market.
Consequently, when using these sources, we face diﬃculties identifying whether the
ﬁrm really has exited the market. On the other hand, the TSR Data Bank provides
information not only on whether the ﬁrm exits but also on which form the exit takes.
By using the TSR Data Bank, we are able to determine whether the ﬁrm exits the
market.
The data set consists of manufacturing ﬁrms founded between 1997 and 2004,
and includes information on the survival and exit of these ﬁrms up to 2009. Using
information on the form of exits, provided by the TSR Data Bank, we classify
exits into three forms: bankruptcy, voluntary liquidation, and merger. The TSR
Data Bank also provides data on ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics, such as legal forms
and the number of employees, in addition to information indicating whether or not
the ﬁrm has survived. Moreover, this source provides data on entrepreneur-speciﬁc
characteristics, including date of birth and educational background.
Regarding industry-speciﬁc characteristics, data on capital intensity, price–cost
margins, and industry growth at the three-digit Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation
(SIC) level in each industry are obtained from the Report by Industry, Census of
8Manufactures compiled by the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI).6
Data on research and development (R&D) intensity at roughly the three-digit SIC
level are taken from the Results of Basic Survey of Japanese Business Structure and
Activities by the METI. In addition, data on gross entry rate at the three-digit SIC
level are obtained from the Establishment and Enterprise Census published by the
Ministry of Internal Aﬀairs and Communications (MIC).7
With respect to region-speciﬁc characteristics, we obtain data on the number
of establishments for the two-digit SIC level at the prefecture level from the Estab-
lishment and Enterprise Census.8 As for regional economic conditions, we use data
on the annual unemployment rate in each prefecture from the Labor Force Survey
of the MIC.
3.2. Diﬀerent forms of exit
As explained above, we classify exits into three forms—bankruptcy, voluntary liq-
uidation, and merger—using the classiﬁcations in the TSR Data Bank. In this
paper, ‘bankruptcy’ indicates the situation in which ﬁrms cannot repay their debts
and thus cease operations. The bankruptcy group includes those ﬁrms applying for
court protection under the Bankruptcy Law, as well as those applying for it under
the Corporate Rehabilitation Law and the Civil Rehabilitation Law enacted in Japan
in April 2000. In addition, ﬁrms whose bills payable are no longer honored by banks
6Unfortunately, industrial classiﬁcations changed during the observation period, and for several
industries, we could not match the classiﬁcations at the three-digit SIC level between the periods
before and after the changes in the SIC. For these industries, we used data at the two-digit SIC
level, instead of the three-digit SIC level. In addition, when data were not available for a year at
the three-digit SIC level, because data were concealed for reasons of conﬁdentiality, we used instead
the average values for these industries in other years during the observation period or values at the
two-digit SIC level.
7The Establishment and Enterprise Census surveys gross entry rates every three or ﬁve years.
Therefore, we used the values of gross entry rates between 1996 and 2001 divided by ﬁve for ﬁrms
founded during the period 1997 to 2001 and the values of gross entry rate between 2001 and 2004
divided by three for ﬁrms founded during the period 2002 to 2004.
8Because the values of the number of establishments at the two-digit SIC level are available for
1996 and 2001, we used the values in 1996 for ﬁrms founded during the period 1997 to 2000 and
the values in 2001 for ﬁrms founded during the period 2001 to 2004.
9are regarded as bankrupt even if they are not necessarily judged as bankrupt by a
court. That is, the class of bankruptcy, in this paper, includes not only ﬁrms legally
declared as bankrupt but also ﬁrms that are inactive from an economic viewpoint.
By contrast, ‘voluntary liquidation’ indicates the situation in which solvent
ﬁrms voluntarily dissolve their businesses. There may be several reasons for volun-
tary liquidation, although it can be diﬃcult to precisely deﬁne the reasons. Some
entrepreneurs may want to dissolve their businesses before facing insolvency, be-
cause they recognize that their businesses are no longer going well. In addition,
those who have the opportunity to receive higher wages as an employee may tend
to voluntarily dissolve their businesses. Other entrepreneurs may be forced to close
their businesses because they are approaching retirement age and cannot ﬁnd any
successors.
Finally, ‘merger’ indicates the situation in which a ﬁrm disappears because of
merger with another ﬁrm.9 Merger does not mean business failure; that is, it does
not necessarily indicate poor performance. Rather, merging ﬁrms and investors pay
attention to ﬁrms that have capabilities or valuable resources. From this viewpoint,
ﬁrms with growth potential may become merger targets. Besides, the rational self-
interest of some entrepreneurs may be served by selling their ﬁrms, rather than by
continuing to run their ﬁrms. If entrepreneurs expect high capital gains by selling
their ﬁrms, they are likely to take the exit strategy to collect funds for their next
investment. In this respect, merger appears to be a fairly diﬀerent economic event
from other forms of exit such as bankruptcy.
However, a problem arises when we identify the forms and timing of exit using
the TSR Data Bank, as the month and year of exit for voluntary liquidation and
merger cannot be identiﬁed in the data source. In addition, the month and year of
exit for a few bankruptcies—ﬁrms with a total deﬁcit of less than 10 million yen—
9As mentioned above, merged ﬁrms are regarded as exiting, but merging ﬁrms, that is, the ﬁrms
that absorb the merged ﬁrms, are not regarded as exiting in this paper, because these ﬁrms still
exist in the market.
10cannot be identiﬁed, although the month and year of exit for most bankruptcies
are available in the data source. However, according to TSR, researchers from TSR
collect and maintain ﬁrms’ information by telephone, postal questionnaire, and ﬁeld
surveys several times a year. If a ﬁrm is found to exit, the ﬁrm’s information is no
longer updated. Therefore, using information on the accounting period when the
last statement of accounts before exit was reported, we identify the year of exit for
ﬁrms that have exited because of voluntary liquidation or merger, including those
few bankruptcies of ﬁrms with a total deﬁcit of less than 10 million yen. For these
ﬁrms, the year when the ﬁnal statement of account was reported is regarded as the
year of exit, and we analyze yearly data from 1997 to 2004.10
3.3. Method
Our interest is to estimate the probability that a new ﬁrm will exit at a certain age
and to identify factors aﬀecting the three forms of exit. However, some ﬁrms do
not exit during the observation period; that is, duration is right censored. For this
reason, previous literature has applied the PH model to the survival and exit of new
establishments or ﬁrms over time (e.g., Audretsch and Mahmood, 1991, 1995; Mata
et al., 1995; Honjo, 2000a). As already mentioned, the PH model has advantages
because it can accommodate the right-censored observations.
In this paper, the post-entry performance of new ﬁrms is divided into survival
and, as discussed above, the three forms of exit: bankruptcy, voluntary liquidation,
and merger. Schary (1991) assumed, although her analysis did not focus on new
ﬁrms, that the forms of exit are inherently ordered as follows: survival, merger,
nonfailure, and failure. However, it cannot be reasonably assumed that this order
10However, this conjecture of the year of exit may still have a bias. Therefore, we predicted
the year of exit for all forms of exit, including for ﬁrms with a total deﬁcit greater than or equal
to 10 million yen, based on the year of the last reported statement of account and estimated the
determinants of exit using the CPH model, which is explained below. As a result, we did not ﬁnd
large changes in our estimation results, regardless of the prediction methods for the year of exit.
Instead of the CPH model, we also used a multinomial logit model as a robustness check. The
results were generally consistent with those reported in Section 5.
11holds for all situations. In addition, because there are three forms of exit in our data
set, the occurrence of one of these forms precludes us from observing another form
of exit. For example, once a ﬁrm exits the market by merger, the duration until
bankruptcy or voluntary liquidation cannot be traced. For this reason, Esteve-P´ erez
et al. (2009) proposed to use the CPH model to identify factors aﬀecting each form
of exit. The CPH model has been used to deal with the presence of competing events
that impede the event of interest.11 Following Esteve-P´ erez et al., we use the CPH
model to estimate the determinants of exit among new ﬁrms.12
Suppose that ﬁrm i is at risk of m diﬀerent forms of exit. In this paper, we
consider three forms of exit—bankruptcy, voluntary liquidation, and merger—that
is, m = 3. Let xij denote a vector of covariates aﬀecting form j(= 1;:::;m) of exit.
In the CPH model, the hazard function, ij, at time t is assumed to be written as:
ij(t) = 0j(t)exp(xijj); (1)
where both 0j(t), which is called the baseline hazard function, and j (vector) are
speciﬁc to form j hazard. Suppose that kj refers to the number of ﬁrms that exit
by form j (e.g., bankruptcy) during the observation period. Let tj1;:::;tjkj denote
the kj ordered exits of form j. The partial likelihood function of form j for the CPH














where R(tjh) is the set of ﬁrms at risk of exit at time tjh. By maximizing the
logarithm of the likelihood function, we obtain the estimated results for form j.
Because it is considered that the probability of exit depends heavily on the ﬁrm’s
life-cycle stage, time is measured by ﬁrm age in this paper. That is, t corresponds to
11For more details on the CPH model, see, for example, Cameron and Trivedi (2005).
12Esteve-P´ erez et al. emphasized that the presence of left-truncated observations—ﬁrms that
started businesses before the beginning of the observation period—is not a problem. However, if
the determinants of exit depend on the ﬁrm’s age, the left truncation would be problematic. In
contrast to their analysis, we can avoid the left-truncation problem, because we focus only on new
ﬁrms, which results in the identiﬁcation of the starting year of the ﬁrms in our data set.
12the number of years after the ﬁrm starts a business and the baseline hazard controls
for the risk to all ﬁrms of the same age.13 However, not all the ﬁrms in our data set
were necessarily founded in the same year; that is, entry years diﬀer between ﬁrms.
As new ﬁrms may face diﬀerent macroeconomic conditions related to the year of
entry, we will control for entry-year cohorts in the model. In the following section,
we explain the vector of covariates, xij, in our model.
4. Determinants of exit
As repeatedly explained, we explore heterogeneity in the determinants of exit of
new ﬁrms. More speciﬁcally, we examine empirically how factors aﬀecting the exit
of new ﬁrms vary across bankruptcy, voluntary liquidation, and merger. We discuss
industry-, region-, ﬁrm-, and entrepreneur-speciﬁc characteristics that aﬀect the exit
of new ﬁrms and present independent variables as the determinants of exit.
As for industry-speciﬁc characteristics, we ﬁrst examine the eﬀect of capital
intensity on each form of exit. As is often argued, capital intensity is likely to be
associated with sunk costs (e.g., Cabral, 1995). Large amounts of capital indicate
suﬃcient capacity and size, and new ﬁrms are required to establish and operate
large-sized plants in, for example, processing industries. Because entry and exit
may be limited to some extent in capital-intensive industries, business failure is less
likely to occur in such industries.14 On the other hand, ﬁrms in capital-intensive
industries may have more salable resources, such as physical facilities and real estate,
compared with those in labor-intensive industries. In this respect, it is predicted
that capital intensity has a positive eﬀect on voluntary liquidation and merger. In
this paper, industry’s capital intensity (CAP) is deﬁned as the ratio of physical ﬁxed
13In our data set, there are several cases in which entry and exit occurred in the same year. Fol-
lowing some previous studies (e.g., Thompson, 2005), therefore, the duration of survival is measured
by the ﬁrm’s age plus 0.5, in order to avoid simultaneous entry and exit.
14In addition, capital intensity is closely associated with scale economies, which increase the cost
disadvantage and therefore the exposure to risk confronting a new establishment (Audretsch and
Mahmood, 1995).
13assets to shipments in the year of entry.
We also expect research and development (R&D) intensity to be fairly im-
portant in determining the probability of exit. Esteve-P´ erez et al. (2009) argued
that new ﬁrms entering the market in R&D-intensive industries usually enjoy high
technological opportunities but also face higher uncertainty regarding both the tech-
nological characteristics of new products and their demand. Lin and Huang (2008)
argued that a higher R&D intensity implies greater innovation opportunities for the
industry, and provides better conditions for the entry and survival of new ﬁrms. In
practice, Lin and Huang found that the probability of survival tends to be higher
in R&D-intensive industries than in less R&D-intensive industries. On the other
hand, Siegfried and Evans (1994, p. 140), argue that R&D intensity may function
as a structural barrier to entry because, when R&D is important, potential entrants
may not be able to aﬀord the high initial capitalization required for successful entry.
Large incumbents may also use entry-deterring strategies using R&D investment
(e.g., Smiley, 1988; Bunch and Smiley, 1992). In addition, Shapiro and Khemani
(1987) found that high research intensity associated with sunk costs deters exit,
although it does not deter entry. We therefore expect that R&D intensity has a neg-
ative eﬀect on the occurrence of bankruptcy. The variable for an industry’s R&D
intensity (RD) is deﬁned as the ratio of R&D expenditures to sales in the year of
entry.
We also include a variable for average price–cost margins (PCM). Exit is
usually likely to occur because of low proﬁtability. In practice, some studies found
a negative eﬀect of industry’s proﬁts on exit (e.g., Shapiro and Khemani, 1987). It
is predicted that price–cost margins have a negative inﬂuence on the probability of
exit regardless of the form of exit. The variable for an industry’s price–cost margin
is deﬁned as the value of shipments minus labor and material costs, divided by the
value of shipments in the year of entry.
14Industry growth is also included in the model. Higher industry growth is ex-
pected to give a better environment in which new ﬁrms can survive and grow. On
the other hand, high growth may lead to further investments and therefore ﬁerce
competition. In this respect, the risk of exit may be as high as the chance of suc-
cess. The variable for industry growth (IG) is deﬁned as the diﬀerence of shipments
between the year of entry and the preceding year, divided by the value of shipments
in the preceding year. Moreover, an industry’s entry rate may aﬀect the probability
of exit. It is well known that entry and exit are positively correlated with each
other (e.g., Geroski, 1995). Geroski et al. (2010) found that, in practice, entry rates
at founding persistently decrease the probability of survival. An industry’s gross
entry rate (ENTRY ) is deﬁned as the number of new establishments, divided by
the number of existing establishments.15
In addition to industry-speciﬁc characteristics, we examine the eﬀects of region-
speciﬁc characteristics on exit. A number of studies have examined how regional fac-
tors aﬀect the survival and exit of new ﬁrms. In particular, there have been contra-
dictory arguments about the impact of regional agglomeration (or concentration) on
survival. Positive arguments suggest that high regional agglomeration leads to easy
access to suppliers or customers and favors knowledge spillovers from other ﬁrms.
On the other hand, negative arguments maintain that increases in regional agglom-
eration tend to be associated with ﬁerce competition within regions and therefore
lead to higher probability of exit of ﬁrms. For example, Strotmann (2007) examined
the determinants of survival of new German ﬁrms and found that agglomeration
negatively aﬀects the probability of survival. For Japan, Honjo (2000b) found that
regional agglomeration increases the probability of failure of new software ﬁrms.
By contrast, Fotopoulos and Louri (2000a) examined the diﬀerence in the probabil-
ity of survival of Greek ﬁrms between urban and rural areas, and found that new
ﬁrms tend to survive in urban areas. In this paper, we examine the eﬀect on the
15For more details on the construction of this variable, see footnote 7.
15exit of new ﬁrms of regional agglomeration (AGGLOM), deﬁned as the number
of establishments by the two-digit SIC level per square kilometer at the prefecture
level.
The eﬀect of the variable for unemployment rate (UNEMP) is also examined
to control for regional economic conditions.16 Unemployment rate has often been
used as a measure of economic distress in regions (e.g., Storey, 1994; Acs et al.,
2007). As is often argued, a higher unemployment rate may indicate lower levels of
demand in regions. We expect the unemployment rate would negatively aﬀect the
performance of region-speciﬁc businesses, and thus new ﬁrms in regions with higher
unemployment rates may be more likely to be forced to exit. On the other hand,
Brixy and Grotz (2007) argue that an unfavorable labor market is associated with
low opportunity costs because of a lack of alternatives. Therefore, it is predicted that
entrepreneurs are less likely to dissolve their businesses voluntarily in economically
distressed regions, because they do not have any other employment option. The
variable for unemployment rate is calculated as the ratio of the unemployed to the
labor force in each prefecture.
With respect to ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics, the eﬀect of ﬁrm size is examined
as a determinant of exit.17 A large number of studies have provided evidence that
the probability of survival increases with ﬁrm size (e.g., Audretsch, 1991; Audretsch
and Mahmood, 1991; Audretsch and Mahmood, 1995; Honjo, 2000a, Honjo, 2000b).
Previous literature suggests a number of reasons that larger ﬁrms are more likely to
survive than smaller ﬁrms. Audretsch and Mahmood (1995) argued that larger ﬁrms
may be more likely to be closer to the minimum eﬃcient scale to operate eﬃciently
in a market, and are therefore less likely to be vulnerable than smaller ﬁrms that
16The eﬀect of population growth was estimated to control for regional demand. A number of
studies have found that population growth is an important determinant in new-ﬁrm survival. Acs et
al. (2007) argued that high population growth regions are attractive for doing business, because the
growth may enable ﬁrms to expand their businesses or create new businesses. However, because of
the correlation between this variable and other variables, we do not report results for this variable.
17It should be noted that data on the number of employees are not measured at the year of entry,
because the TSR Data Bank provides only the latest information on the number of employees.
16operate further up the cost curve. Fazzari et al. (1988) argued that large and small
ﬁrms have diﬀerent access to funds, and small ﬁrms have more limited access to
external ﬁnance than do large ﬁrms. Geroski et al. (2010) also pointed out that
larger ﬁrms may be more eﬃcient than smaller ﬁrms, not because they operate at
a diﬀerent point on the cost curve, but because they may have diﬀerent managerial
capabilities. That is, a ﬁrm’s size may be a consequence of its capabilities.
The eﬀect of this variable may vary between the diﬀerent forms of exit. Harhoﬀ
et al. (1998) suggest that because the exit mechanism of insolvency is not proﬁtable
for ﬁrms below some minimum size and an insolvency procedure involves high trans-
action costs, debtors and creditors may prefer less formal agreements, such as volun-
tary liquidation. For this reason, smaller ﬁrms may tend to exit through voluntary
liquidation rather than through bankruptcy. On the other hand, large ﬁrms may
have larger exit barriers than small ﬁrms, because the bankruptcy of a large ﬁrm has
an impact on many stakeholders, which may lead to an increase in unemployment.
Therefore, a larger distressed ﬁrm might prefer to ﬁnd a rescuer who can buy the
ﬁrm rather than liquidate themselves. In this paper, the number of employees is our
measure of ﬁrm size.18 In our analysis, taking into account the nonlinear relationship
between ﬁrm size and exit, we use several dummies for size classes in terms of the
number of employees: 1–4 employees (reference), 5–9 employees (SIZE_5-9), 10–19
employees (SIZE_10-19), 20 employees and more (SIZE_20). A dummy variable
for joint stock companies (JSTOCK) is also included to control for diﬀerences in
legal forms of new ﬁrms.19
Regarding entrepreneur-speciﬁc characteristics, we examine the eﬀects of edu-
18We also used data on paid-in capital as a measure of ﬁrm size. Compared with total assets,
paid-in capital does not include liabilities or retained proﬁts. While total assets may be more
suitable to represent the ﬁrm’s asset size, total assets include liabilities and large liabilities that
increase the probability of bankruptcy. However, as paid-in capital was closely correlated to other
variables, such as the dummy for joint stock companies, we do not report the results for paid-in
capital.
19However, we regard this variable simply as a control variable, because our sample mainly consists
of joint stock companies (52.8%). Therefore, we may not be able to provide a conclusive answer on
this variable.
17cational background as a determinant of exit of new ﬁrms. As already discussed,
some studies emphasize that entrepreneurs’ human capital plays an important role
in ﬁrm survival. Bates (1990) found that entrepreneurs’ human capital inputs aﬀect
small business longevity, and Cressy (1996) argued that human capital is the true
determinant of ﬁrm survival. The eﬀect of educational background may also vary
between the diﬀerent forms of exit. It is particularly expected that while ﬁrms with
highly educated entrepreneurs are less likely to go bankrupt, large ﬁrms may tend to
disappear by merger because of their superior resources. On the other hand, it is of-
ten argued that because highly educated people tend to have alternative employment
opportunities and receive a large number of job oﬀers, they are more likely to move
to alternative employment (e.g., Gimeno et al. 1997; Taylor, 1999). The variable for
educational background is deﬁned as a dummy variable indicating the value of one if
the entrepreneur has a university education (EDU_UNIV ). However, because the
entrepreneur’s educational background is unknown for some observations in our data
set, a dummy variable for those ﬁrms (EDU_X) is also included in the model. The
eﬀect of the entrepreneur’s age when the entrepreneur started the business is exam-
ined in the model. When some entrepreneurs are approaching retirement age and
cannot ﬁnd a successor, they may be more likely to close their companies voluntarily.
In our analysis, we use several dummy variables for age classes: less than 30 years
old (reference), 30–39 years old (AGE_30-39), 40–49 years old (AGE_40-49), 50–59
years old (AGE_50-59), 60 years old and more (AGE_60). If the entrepreneur’s age
is unknown, a dummy variable (AGE_X) is used.
Using these independent variables, we explore the determinants of exit of new
ﬁrms according to forms of exit—bankruptcy, voluntary liquidation, and merger.
185. Results
5.1. Descriptive statistics
Our sample consists of 15,841 manufacturing ﬁrms founded in Japan during 1997–
2004, with data until 2009. Table 1 presents summary statistics for three forms of
exit by year of entry. An important fact, although not surprising, is that new ﬁrms
indeed exit the market in diﬀerent ways. As shown in Table 1, 717 (4.5%) of the
15,841 ﬁrms in the sample exited the market through bankruptcy. A total of 1,280
ﬁrms (8.1%) voluntarily closed their businesses and 442 ﬁrms (2.8%) disappeared
because of merger. Therefore, the total number of exited ﬁrms in the sample is 2,439
(15.4%).
Table 2 shows summary statistics for the forms of exit by sector. A clear ﬁnd-
ing is that the exit ratios diﬀer considerably between sectors. For example, in the
beverage and feed sector, the exit rate for each form is lower than the mean rate of
all industries. On the other hand, as shown in Table 2, in the information and com-
munication electronics equipment sector, the exit rate for all forms of exit (21.5%)
is highest, and the exit rate for each form of exit is higher than the means of all
industries. These facts suggest that industry-speciﬁc characteristics are important
factors in determining the exit of new ﬁrms.
Another ﬁnding is that the exit ratio varies across the forms of exit even within
an industry. In the textiles sector, for example, 79 (6.6%) and 120 (10.0%) of
the 1,203 ﬁrms in the sample went bankrupt and voluntarily closed the business,
respectively. The exit ratios by bankruptcy and by voluntary liquidation in this
industry are higher than the means of all industries. By contrast, 27 (2.2%) of the
1,203 ﬁrms disappeared because of merger; this exit ratio is less than the means
of all industries. These statistics suggest the presence of heterogeneities in the
determinants of exit across bankruptcy, voluntary liquidation, and merger.
195.2. Estimation results
Using the CPH model, we estimate the determinants of exit according to forms of
exit. The deﬁnition of the variables and descriptive statistics are shown in Tables 3
and 4, respectively. Table 5 shows the estimation results by forms of exit. Column
(i) of Table 5 shows the results using a pooled sample of all forms of exit, in order
to compare the pooled results with each form of exit separately. In Column (i) of
Table 5, the industry’s price–cost margins (PCM) and gross entry rate (ENTRY )
have signiﬁcantly negative and positive eﬀects on the hazards of the pooled exit,
respectively. However, other independent industry-speciﬁc characteristics have no
signiﬁcant eﬀects on the hazards of exit. Region-speciﬁc characteristics have no sig-
niﬁcant eﬀects on the hazards of exit in Column (i) of Table 5. With respect to
ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics, SIZE_5-9 and SIZE_10-19 have negative and signif-
icant eﬀects on the hazards of pooled exit, although the eﬀect of SIZE_20 is not
signiﬁcant. This suggests that there is a nonlinear relationship between ﬁrm size
and exit. The dummy variable for joint stock companies (JSTOCK) has a signiﬁ-
cantly positive eﬀect, although this is simply included as a control variable. As for
entrepreneur-speciﬁc characteristics, the variables for educational background and
age have signiﬁcant eﬀects on the pooled exit results, indicating that ﬁrms whose
entrepreneurs had a university education and were approaching retirement age were
more likely to exit.
Columns (ii)–(iv) of Table 5 show the estimation results for the determinants
of exit of new ﬁrms by forms of exit. The variable for capital intensity (CAP), as
shown in Column (ii) of Table 5, has negative and signiﬁcant eﬀects on exit through
bankruptcy. This result indicates that new ﬁrms tend to survive longer in capital-
intensive industries. On the other hand, Columns (iii)–(iv) of Table 5 indicate that
CAP has positive and signiﬁcant eﬀects on voluntary liquidation and merger, sug-
gesting that new ﬁrms are more likely to exit through voluntary liquidation and
20merger in industries characterized by large amounts of capital. These results may
suggest that because ﬁrms in capital-intensive industries may have more salable re-
sources, debtors and creditors prefer to dissolve businesses via voluntary liquidation
or merger rather than bankruptcy using a legal procedure.
R&D intensity (RD) also has negative and signiﬁcant eﬀects on the hazards of
bankruptcy in Column (ii) of Table 5. This result supports the sunk-cost explana-
tion, which is consistent with some previous studies, including Shapiro and Khemani
(1987). On the other hand, RD has no signiﬁcant eﬀect on exit through voluntary
liquidation or merger, as shown in Columns (iii) and (iv) of Table 5.
Price–cost margin (PCM) has a negative eﬀect on exit in all the models of
Table 5, although the eﬀect on bankruptcy is not signiﬁcant in Column (ii). This
result suggests that low proﬁts are likely to lead to exit. This is also consistent
with the result of Shapiro and Khemani (1987). Given that high price–cost margins
represent the absence of competitive pressure, our result indicates that new ﬁrms
are less likely to exit in industries lacking competitive pressure.
As shown in Table 5, although we expected that industry growth (IG) would
have signiﬁcant eﬀects on exit, we did not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant eﬀects. This is,
however, consistent with the result of Audretsch and Mahmood (1995). As already
discussed, while higher growth is expected to give a better environment in which
new ﬁrms can survive and grow, it may lead to further investments and therefore
ﬁerce competition. The risk of failure may be as high as the chance of success, and
this may be one of the reasons that we do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant results for industry
growth. Industry’s gross entry rate (ENTRY ) indicates positive signs in all models
of Table 5. Our ﬁndings suggest that higher entry rates at founding decrease the
probability of survival. This is consistent with the ﬁnding of Geroski et al. (2010).
With respect to region-speciﬁc characteristics, regional agglomeration (AGGLOM)
has a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on exit through bankruptcy, as indicated in Col-
21umn (ii) of Table 5. This result suggests that bankruptcy is more likely in com-
petitive areas than in uncompetitive areas. As discussed above, while many studies
have provided contradictory evidence on the impact of regional density, our result
supports the negative impact of agglomeration on the post-entry performance of
ﬁrms. Our ﬁnding is also consistent with some empirical studies, including Strot-
mann (2007). On the other hand, this variable has a signiﬁcantly negative eﬀect on
voluntary liquidation. This supports the positive view of agglomeration.
Unemployment rate (UNEMP) has a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on bankruptcy,
whereas it has a negative and signiﬁcant eﬀect on voluntary liquidation in Table 5.
As predicted, the result suggests that new ﬁrms are more likely to be forced into
bankruptcy in economically distressed regions. On the other hand, our result sug-
gests that entrepreneurs might be less likely to close their businesses voluntarily in
economically distressed regions, because they do not have alternative employment
in such regions.
Regarding ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics, SIZE_5-9 and SIZE_10-19 have posi-
tive and signiﬁcant eﬀects on bankruptcy in Column (ii) of Table 5. On the other
hand, SIZE_5-9, SIZE_10-19, and SIZE_20 have negative and signiﬁcant eﬀects
on voluntary liquidation in Column (iii) of Table 5. Moreover, the eﬀects only of
SIZE_10-19, and SIZE_20 are positive and signiﬁcant in Column (iii) of Table 5.
As discussed, this result is consistent with the argument of Harhoﬀ et al. (1998)
that the exit mechanism of insolvency is not proﬁtable for ﬁrms below some mini-
mum size and an insolvency procedure requires signiﬁcant transactions costs, debtors
and creditors may prefer more informal agreements, such as voluntary liquidation.
Therefore, small-sized ﬁrms are more likely to exit via voluntary liquidation than
via bankruptcy. Alternatively, our results provide evidence that large ﬁrms are less
likely to close their businesses regardless of involuntary or voluntary liquidation.
The eﬀect of joint stock companies (JSTOCK) is positive and signiﬁcant only in
22Column (iv) of Table 5, although this variable was simply included as a control
variable.
The dummy variable for entrepreneur’s educational background, university
education (EDU_UNIV ), has a negative and signiﬁcant eﬀect on exit through
bankruptcy in Column (ii) of Table 5. This result indicates that ﬁrms with highly
educated entrepreneurs tend to survive better than others, suggesting that en-
trepreneurs’ human capital is fairly important for the survival of new ﬁrms. This
is consistent with some previous studies, including Bates (1990), Cressy (1996) and
Honjo (2000a). On the other hand, as shown in Column (iii) of Table 5, the dummy
variable for university education has a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on exit through
voluntary liquidation and merger. This suggests that ﬁrms with highly educated en-
trepreneurs are more likely to exit the market via voluntary liquidation and merger.
The fact that ﬁrms with highly educated entrepreneurs are more likely to voluntar-
ily close their companies is probably because highly educated entrepreneurs have
greater opportunities for alternative employment. This is consistent with Gimeno
et al. (1997) and Taylor (1999).
The entrepreneur’s age has no signiﬁcant eﬀect on bankruptcy, as shown in
Column (ii) of Table 5, while only AGE_50-59 and AGE_60 have positive and
signiﬁcant eﬀects on voluntary liquidation, as in Column (iii) of Table 5. This
suggests that when entrepreneurs are approaching retirement age, they are more
likely to voluntarily close their companies. This is consistent with some previous
studies, including Harhoﬀ et al. (1998).
5.3. Discussion
We have examined the determinants of new-ﬁrm exit by form of exit. Although,
as shown in Table 5, the coeﬃcients of several variables are insigniﬁcant for pooled
exit, some of these coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant for each form of exit. In particular,
23capital intensity does not have signiﬁcant eﬀects on the probability of pooled exit,
but it has signiﬁcantly diﬀerent eﬀects on bankruptcy, voluntary liquidation, and
merger. R&D intensity has insigniﬁcant eﬀects on the probability of pooled exit,
while it has negative and signiﬁcant eﬀects on that of bankruptcy. This shows
that the probability of bankruptcy of new ﬁrms decreases in capital-intensive and
R&D-intensive industries. However, when treating the three forms—bankruptcy,
voluntary liquidation, and merger—as pooled exit, we cannot detect any signiﬁcant
eﬀects of these characteristics on the exit of new ﬁrms, as shown in Column (i) of
Table 5. This suggests that the determinants vary according to the forms of exit,
and we thus emphasize that there are economic diﬀerences between the forms of exit.
Ignoring heterogeneity between the forms of exit may lead to critical eﬀects on the
exit of new ﬁrms being overlooked. To better understand the post-entry performance
of new ﬁrms, we can say that the forms of exit should be taken into account in the
analysis. Evaluating the determinants of exit of new ﬁrms more precisely would
contribute to the further development of research on industry dynamics.
As mentioned above, the creation of new ﬁrms is of particular interest for
economic growth, especially in some developed countries, including Japan. In Japan,
the government has until the present day attempted to conduct support programs for
new ﬁrms. For example, the Creative Business Promotion Law was enacted in 1995
to enhance the capital investment of small and medium enterprises (SMEs). Harada
and Honjo (2005) and Honjo and Harada (2006) showed that the approval of this law
substantially increased SMEs’ new investments and promoted SMEs’ asset growth.
In addition, a tax concession for ‘angels’ (individual investors) was introduced in
1997 to stimulate new entry. These policies were expected to have contributed to
the creation of new ﬁrms during the recent recession period. However, according to
the 2008 White Papers on Small and Medium Enterprises in Japan, the number of
new ﬁrms did not increase after the so-called bubble economy of the late 1980s.
24It has often been argued that Japanese domestic industry is characterized by
low metabolism and ineﬃcient reallocations between incumbents and entrants. Some
studies have argued that the natural selection mechanism does not work well in pe-
riods of recession (e.g., Nishimura et al., 2005; Fukao and Kwon, 2006). However,
these studies focused mainly on the behavior of established ﬁrms; hence, diﬀerent
results might be obtained if the behavior of new ﬁrms was highlighted. Despite the
importance of entry and exit for the natural selection mechanism through compe-
tition, little attention has been paid to the post-entry performance of new ﬁrms in
Japan.
The ﬁndings of this paper include several important implications. The results
show that bankruptcy is less likely to occur in industries with high capital and R&D
intensities, whereas voluntary liquidation and merger are more likely to occur in
capital-intensive industries. This fact may suggest that factors of production tend
to be reallocated without bankruptcy in the industries where sunk costs seem higher
because of asset speciﬁcity among the manufacturing industries. In addition, the
results indicate that the variables on the intensity of market competition, such as
price–cost margin and gross entry rate, generally increase the probability of exit of
new ﬁrms, after controlling for region-, ﬁrm- and entrepreneur-speciﬁc character-
istics. Alternatively, the results imply that while entrepreneurs with high human
capital are less likely to go bankrupt, they have more opportunities to change their
jobs voluntarily or to be successfully acquired by other ﬁrms. These ﬁndings may
indicate that eﬃcient reallocation through the natural selection mechanism works to
some extent in Japanese manufacturing industries. We suggest that policy makers
should pay more attention to industry dynamics and apply the natural selection
mechanism to the development of industries. Therefore, we argue that this pa-
per provides a better understanding of industry dynamics and important ideas for
economic policy.
256. Conclusions
This paper has explored heterogeneous exits—bankruptcy, voluntary liquidation,
and merger—by focusing on new ﬁrms. Using a sample of approximately 16,000
ﬁrms founded in Japan from 1997 to 2004, we examined heterogeneities in the de-
terminants of exit between diﬀerent forms of exit up to 2009. Regarding industry-
speciﬁc characteristics, our ﬁndings indicated that new ﬁrms in capital-intensive and
R&D-intensive industries are less likely to go bankrupt. On the other hand, new
ﬁrms in industries characterized by high capital intensity and low price–cost margins
are more likely to exit via voluntary liquidation and merger. We also found that
gross entry rate had signiﬁcantly positive eﬀects on exit regardless of form of exit.
Region-speciﬁc characteristics, such as regional agglomeration and unemployment
rate, had signiﬁcant eﬀects on exit, and their eﬀects vary between diﬀerent forms of
exit. Moreover, we provided evidence that ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics, such as the
number of employees, and entrepreneur-speciﬁc characteristics, such as educational
background and age, play signiﬁcantly diﬀerent roles in determining the rate of each
form of exit.
However, our paper has some limitations. While we have examined the deter-
minants of exit of new ﬁrms, we could not include some variables, especially those
variables associated with ﬁnancial conditions. New ﬁrms are likely to face diﬃculties
in securing initial funds from external capital markets. Fotopoulos and Louri (2000b)
and Huynh et al. (2010), for example, provide evidence that initial ﬁnancial condi-
tions are important factors in determining the exit of new ﬁrms. As Buddelmeyer
et al. (2010) and Wagner and Cockburn (2010) found, intangible resources, such
as patents and trademarks, may also have an impact on ﬁrm survival. Therefore,
it is worthwhile investigating heterogeneity across new ﬁrms, which may indicate
the capabilities and resources of new ﬁrms. In addition, it would be interesting
to extend this research to other industries because, for example, service industries
26have recently attracted the attention of entrepreneurs, rather than manufacturing
industries. Despite the limitations of this study, we revealed heterogeneity in the
determinants of exit across bankruptcy, voluntary liquidation, and merger; this has
not been examined in previous literature. Entry and exit are essential to industry
dynamics, and further investigation on this topic is warranted.
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36Table 4: The summary statistics of independent variables
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Minimum Maximum
CAP 0.235 0.093 0.009 2.334
RD 0.027 0.020 0.001 0.132
PCM 0.288 0.075 0.026 0.748
IG -0.018 0.093 -0.538 0.874
ENTRY 0.027 0.010 0.004 0.113
AGGLOM 1.022 1.719 0.0004 9.991
UNEMP 0.045 0.012 0.017 0.084
SIZE_5-9 0.247 0.431 0 1
SIZE_10-19 0.169 0.375 0 1
SIZE_20 0.205 0.404 0 1
JSTOCK 0.528 0.499 0 1
EDU_UNIV 0.271 0.445 0 1
EDU_X 0.463 0.499 0 1
AGE_30-39 0.149 0.356 0 1
AGE_40-49 0.222 0.416 0 1
AGE_50-59 0.269 0.443 0 1
AGE_60 0.085 0.279 0 1
AGE_X 0.243 0.429 0 1
Notes: The number of observations is 15841.
37Table 5: Estimation results
Forms of exit
Variable (i) Pooled exit (ii) Bankruptcy (iii) Voluntary (iv) Merger
CAP 0:290  1:999 0:660 0:776
(0.214) (0.563) (0.215) (0.342)
RD  1:862  6:909 0.045  0:146
(1.201) (2.352) (1.607) (2.566)
PCM  0:882  0:093  0:900  1:269
(0.301) (0.540) (0.391) (0.599)
IG  0:298  0:327  0:165  0:360
(0.253) (0.466) (0.341) (0.568)
ENTRY 7:805 7:993 5:849 9:357
(2.453) (4.330) (3.192) (5.079)
AGGLOM  0:015 0:056  0:058  0:051
(0.013) (0.019) (0.019) (0.034)
UNEMP  1:452 6:737  7:536 2:844
(2.283) (3.970) (3.100) (5.167)
SIZE_5-9  0:335 0:185  0:627 0:096
(0.057) (0.100) (0.076) (0.204)
SIZE_10-19  0:224 0:415  0:832 0:790
(0.064) (0.110) (0.098) (0.191)
SIZE_20 0:012 0:072  0:665 1:554
(0.059) (0.125) (0.089) (0.173)
JSTOCK 0:230 0:081 0:104 1:202
(0.049) (0.091) (0.067) (0.168)
EDU_UNIV 0:161  0:237 0:321 0:485
(0.057) (0.099) (0.081) (0.148)
EDU_X 0:104  0:305 0:201 0:643
(0.058) (0.101) (0.080) (0.155)
AGE_30-39  0:034  0:025 0:020  0:249
(0.144) (0.217) (0.214) (0.405)
AGE_40-49 0:188 0:073 0:232 0:382
(0.137) (0.210) (0.204) (0.372)
AGE_50-59 0:463 0:037 0:642 0:696
(0.135) (0.209) (0.199) (0.365)
AGE_60 0:785 0:230 1:113 0:579
(0.143) (0.231) (0.207) (0.397)
AGE_X 0:452 0:054 0:655 0:547
(0.139) (0.219) (0.206) (0.368)
Entry year cohorts Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 15841 15841 15841 15841
Number of exits 2439 717 1280 442
Number of competing risks – 1722 1159 1997
Log pseudolikelihood  22881:595  6679:904  12013:969  3957:098
Notes:
1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
2. ***, **, and * indicate signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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